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Political Economy of Labor Retrenchment:
Evidence Based on China’s State-Owned Enterprises

Abstract
This study examines the determinants of the restructuring of China’s
SOEs in the late 1990s. Our study yields four major findings. First, we find
that the degree of labor retrenchment is negatively related to enterprise
performance, suggesting that poor performance is a major force driving
labor restructuring. Second, we find that market competition is related to
both traditional and corporatized SOEs, suggesting that market competition
gradually becomes an effective disciplinary force for managers of China’s
SOEs. Furthermore, we offer evidence that decisions about labor
retrenchment in traditional SOEs are related to the local government’s fiscal
position and to local reemployment conditions for laid-off workers. In
contrast, labor decisions in corporatized SOEs are not related to these two
variables. This suggests that corporatized SOEs with partial private
ownership seem to enjoy higher autonomy in labor decisions.

Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: P26, P31, G38.
Key Words: Political Control, State Owned Enterprises, Labor Restructuring
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the transformation economies of the post-Soviet era, enterprises often found
themselves with a significant stock of surplus labor created by central labor allocation and
full employment guarantees under the socialist system. Employment restructuring thus
became one of the major objectives of enterprise reform in all these economies. To
improve their performance, enterprises not only had to adjust their product assortment in
response to consumer preferences and rapidly changing market conditions but also had to
optimize factor inputs. Labor reforms usually started with the promulgation of flexible
labor regulations and laws. Highly variable progress within employment restructuring
suggests that the formal provision of market-oriented labor laws and regulations serves as a
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for successful labor restructuring. Labor
retrenchment commonly encounters complex and multifaceted constraints, with politicaleconomic constraints among the crucial determinants of their success (Fleisher and Yang,
2003).
Among China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs), inertia in the labor retrenchment effort
has been pronounced. There are two types of SOEs in China: those that maintain 100%
state ownership (traditional SOEs), and those that have undergone ownership
diversification but still have dominant state shares (corporatized SOEs). SOEs were
granted some formal autonomy in labor decisions in the mid-1980s but did not undertake
any significant labor restructuring until the mid-1990s. Although SOE profits fell by 50%
between 1994 and 1996, they failed to restructure in any significant sense. In fact, the size
of the total SOE work force increased slightly (see Table 1).
3

Insert Table 1 about here

Many observers have identified continuing government interference in labor decisions
as a major cause of China’s slow SOE labor restructuring. Bai et al. (2002) argue that
SOEs in China were used as policy tools to provide exaggerated levels of employment
because alternative institutions for social welfare provision (unemployment benefits) are
still underdeveloped or even nonexistent. Groves et al. (1995) offer evidence that
increasing de facto managerial independence from political control in labor decisions was
positively related to labor productivity and enterprise performance in China’s SOEs from
1980 to 1989. This result confirms the existence of political control in SOEs’ labor
decisions. Dong and Putterman (2002) further establish that hardening budget constraints,
without relieving SOEs of their social burden, was a major proximate cause of rising
redundant labor in the early 1990s.
Because of low productivity levels and growing enterprise debts, in 1997 China’s
central government pledged to reverse SOEs’ money-losing trends within a three-year
period, with labor retrenchment as one of the major reform measures. The government’s
commitment to improving SOE performance through large-scale labor restructuring is
illustrated by its increasing provision of financial assistance and labor reemployment
services for displaced workers (Dong 2003). Within four years (1997–2000), the state
sector’s work force decreased by more than 30 million workers (about 27%), and labor
productivity increased by 100% (see Table 1). In spite of significant progress in labor
4

retrenchment as signaled by aggregate data, however, little systematic research has been
conducted to examine the underlying causal patterns and determinants of the recent
restructuring wave. Which enterprises successfully took on the challenge of restructuring?
Can we still observe evidence of government control in SOEs’ labor decisions? Is there any
difference between traditional and corporatized SOEs in terms of labor retrenchment?
These are all questions that need to be answered.
Based on data obtained from a World Bank survey, this paper investigates the major
driving forces of labor restructuring among China’s SOEs from 1998 to 2000. Specifically,
we examine how the degree of labor retrenchment is related to a set of business-related and
political-economic determinants. To the best of our knowledge, our study is among the first
to investigate the causal pattern of labor restructuring during the most recent SOE reforms.
Empirical evidence on this issue will shed some light on the nature of labor policies in
SOEs and on the nexus between government and SOEs in China’s increasingly marketoriented economy. An understanding of the government-SOE nexus in China is particularly
critical, as the government is determined to maintain large and medium-sized SOEs as an
important part of the economic system.
The paper is structured as follows: The next section provides a brief account of China’s
labor market reforms since 1978 and the specific institutional background of SOEs’
employment restructuring in the late 1990s. Section 3 discusses the potential determinants
of an SOE’s labor policies and sets out our hypotheses. Section 4 presents our estimation
model and results. Section 5 concludes.
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2. LABOR MARKET REFORMS: THE INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND STATUS QUO
Before reform, labor in China was directly allocated to SOEs. In return, SOEs had to
fulfill production quotas specified by production plans and had to provide workers with
comprehensive benefits packages including subsidized housing, education, health care, and
retirement pensions. Following the introduction of industrial reforms in the early 1980s, a
“dual-track transition” of the labor market was instituted. Free labor markets were
developed in the newly emerging non-state sector, while SOEs continued to perform the
dual tasks of producing goods and providing social welfare and only gradually acquired the
formal right to make independent employment decisions according to their production
needs (Bai et al. 2002).
A first important breakthrough in the liberalization of the labor system was achieved in
1986, when the labor contract system (laodong hetongzhi) was introduced on a pilot basis
to

replace

socialist-style

lifelong

employment

in

SOEs.

In

addition,

SOEs’

directors/managers acquired the right to conduct entrance exams to screen promising job
applicants, to refuse ill-qualified applicants, and to institute a probation period for new
hires. To stave off opposition of the new system, it was first applied only to new hires; it
became universal only in 1996. As a consequence, the move toward contract-based labor
proceeded slowly. By the end of 1995 only 40% of SOE employees were working under
the new system, while complete implementation of the system was not realized until 2000
(China’s Labor Statistics Yearbook, various years).
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In 1992 the “regulations for the transformation of enterprise mechanisms of stateowned enterprises” were promulgated. Art. 17 gave management, for the first time, the
formal right to autonomously make decisions about “conditions and type of employment as
well as the number of employees.” Central plans for labor allocation were abolished in
1993.
The implementation of China’s Labor Law in 1995 was probably the most important
legal reform, as this law formally grants all enterprises, including SOEs, legal rights to
restructure and to eliminate excessive labor. The liberalization effect of the law rests on
three crucial provisions, which facilitate adjustment and restructuring decisions: (1) the
general application of labor contracts with time limits (Art. 19); (2) agreements on
probation periods (Art. 21); and, most important, (3) the right to cut down on manpower
when an enterprise runs into economic difficulties (Art. 27). In particular, the latter
provision introduces new flexibility for timely labor adjustments in response to an
enterprise’s order situation and profitability. As labor relations between employers and
employees are legally specified, and labor contracts can be terminated by both sides, the
law formally finalized the break with China’s “iron rice bowl.” Authority over labor
decisions was formally transferred from the state to enterprise managers in all enterprises,
including SOEs.
Despite a wide range of policy measures introduced to reform SOEs, up to the mid1990s the dismissal of state employees remained a rarity, and most SOEs still provided
non-wage welfare benefits (Dong 2003). Zhang (1994) reports that only 2% of SOEs made
use of their formal rights to terminate labor contracts. Based on a panel data set of 681
7

SOEs in four provinces (Jiangsu, Sichuan, Shanxi, and Jilin), Dong and Putterman (2002)
confirm that SOE managers’ ability to perform downward adjustment of the labor force
remained seriously limited until 1994. Bodmer (2002) documents the degree and the effects
of labor reforms in Chinese SOEs up to 1994 and concludes that reforms relevant to
employment decisions in SOEs remained very limited in scope. In addition, ample
evidence shows that a large proportion of SOEs have failed to restructure and remain
burdened by excess manpower and low productivity.
The lack of effective labor restructuring up to the mid-1990s has been largely attributed
to the use of SOEs for employment and social security provision (Meng and Kid 1997, Bai
et al. 2002). In the late 1990s the heavily indebted and ailing state sector forced the
government to address the labor redundancy problem. Since then, millions of workers have
been let go. Nevertheless, labor restructuring in China’s SOEs is still an unfinished
endeavor. Brooks and Tao (2003) estimate that about 10 to 18 million workers were still
redundant in 2001.

3. WHEN DO STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES RESTRUCTURE? SOME POLITICAL ECONOMY
CONSIDERATIONS AND HYPOTHESES
In a neo-classical world, an enterprise’s labor input would be calculated based on a
production function, input prices, and expected sales, while flexible labor markets would
guarantee smooth adjustment processes. SOEs, however, seldom operate as independent
business entities responding only to market forces. This is because politicians tend to use
them to enhance their political support (Buchanan et al. 1980, Shapiro and Willig 1990,
8

Shleifer and Vishny 1994).1 This tendency is particularly strong in socialist systems and is
especially pronounced in China because China’s danwei-socialism guaranteed urban SOE
workers not only lifetime employment but also a wide range of benefits such as
inexpensive housing, free medical care, and diverse types of subsidies and in-kind
payments (Naughton 1997). SOE workers were thus naturally reluctant to accept marketbased labor reforms. Dong and Ye (2003) offer evidence that employees of loss-making
enterprises in China tended to cling to their jobs, preferring to take wage cuts than to
change jobs. Workers frequently expressed their discontent through protests and strikes
(Lee 1998) as well as through “collective inaction” in the form of noncompliance,
absenteeism, and evasion (Whyte 1987, Zhou 1993, Lee 1998). Protests and strikes often
compelled the government to pressure enterprise managers to hire extra workers or to
refrain from imposing additional layoffs, whereas collective inaction generated direct
pressure on managers because managers’ performance is dependent on workers’
cooperation (Whyte 1987, Lee 1998).2
The Chinese Communist government, on the other hand, is eager to continue danweisocialism to secure social support (Opper, Wong, and Hu 2002). Although the theory of
political business cycles has been developed largely with reference to democratic political
systems, the general idea that politicians’ survival rests on public support also holds for
autocratic regimes. Even China’s one-party regime needs to respond to major interest

1

Politicians are particularly apt to intervene in labor decisions, since employment opportunities and wage
levels provide convenient tools by which to redistribute wealth from the common pool to the favored parties
(Nordhaus 1975, Frey and Schneider 1978).
2
Bai et al. (2000) provide a formal model establishing the superiority of delayed privatization and continuing
provision of social security by SOEs if social stability is weak.
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groups, such as the urban working class, if political stability and the immediate survival
of the political leadership are to be secured. Using SOEs to keep redundant labor seemed
particularly important during the early transition period when a sustainable social security
system was not yet in place and the newly emerging private sector lacked the capacity to
absorb excessive labor.
Bai et al. (2002) argue that managers in China’s SOEs were in fact charged with the
dual role of maintaining production and providing social security. To induce them to shift
efforts from production to social security provision, the government provided them with
smaller profit incentives, which led to SOEs’ continuous poor performance. In spite of
significant progress in reducing the number of redundant workers, in our view, the recent
wave of labor retrenchment is unlikely to signal a complete depoliticization of labor
policies. Rather, managers will continue to perform the dual role of maintaining production
and providing social security. Thus, we assume that labor retrenchment in SOEs is a
function of both business-related and political-economic factors. To test our assumption,
we develop four hypotheses on these two types of determinants and then empirically
examine whether labor retrenchment in SOEs is actually related to these factors.

Business-related factors
Enterprise performance. Studies on adjustment strategies following an enterprise’s
performance decline indicate that downsizing of the work force is one of the most
commonly adopted short-term strategies to improve enterprise performance (Denis and
Kruse 2000, Kang and Shivdasani 1997). Enterprises burdened with excessive employment
10

are particularly likely to benefit from labor adjustments, as cutting redundant labor can
reduce labor costs without affecting production capacity and sales. We expect that
H1:

The degree of labor retrenchment is negatively related to enterprise performance.

Competition. Studies on SOEs in Eastern European transitional economies support the role
of competition, as they find that many SOEs have undertaken restructuring activities “that
are broadly consistent with what would be expected of profit-maximizing firms” (Pinto et
al. 1994, Aghion et al. 1994, Brada et al. 1994, Estrin et al. 1995, Brada 1996, p. 80).
Overall, we expect that
H2:

The degree of labor retrenchment is positively related to the degree of

competition.

Political-economic factors
Government’s fiscal position. The fact that government interference in labor decisions
affects government budget position by increasing expenditures (e.g., subsidies to SOEs)
and decreasing revenues (e.g., tax income) suggests that a government’s fiscal capacity will
limit its ability to fund excessive employment (Sheifer and Vishny 1994).3 A tight fiscal
position (i.e., a high budget deficit) might increase the government’s willingness to accept
politically unpopular labor retrenchment, since labor shedding and the concomitant
improvement in financial performance brings financial release via tax increases and

3

Empirical studies on privatization suggest that a government’s policymaking decisions depend to some
extent on the tightness of fiscal budget constraints. State withdrawal, in general, is more likely to occur during
an economic crisis when financial conditions are dire and public debt is regarded as excessive (World Bank
1995).
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subsidy reduction (Li 1998). At the same time, managers’ willingness to comply with
requests articulated by the government and workers depends on their budget constraints
and on the likelihood that they will be compensated for retaining excessive labor (Shleifer
and Vishny 1994). A tight fiscal position signals relatively harder budget constraints for
SOEs as well as a decreased likelihood of being adequately compensated by the
government for retaining excessive employment. We hypothesize that
H3:

The degree of labor entrenchment is negatively related to the government’s

budget.

Absorption capacity of laid-off workers. While early models of political business cycles
assume that a government’s incentives and expected benefits from inducing political cycles
do not vary over time, more recent research has revealed that the expected benefits for
manipulating the economy should be negatively correlated with the level of the
government’s political security and the size of the support base (Schultz 1995). As low
reemployment possibilities for surplus workers increase workers’ resistance to labor
retrenchment and weaken a government’s political security and support base, a government
will benefit more (politically) by funding a certain level of excess labor if reemployment
possibilities for surplus worker are low. In contrast, a government will benefit less
(politically) by funding a certain level of excess labor if reemployment possibilities are
high. Therefore, the local absorption capacity for surplus labor could be a government’s
major political concern. Overall, we expect that
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H4:

The degree of labor retrenchment is positively related to the local absorption

capacity for surplus labor.

We do not expect the determinants of labor retrenchment to possess the same degree of
explanatory power irrespective of an enterprise’s ownership structure. Equal impact on
labor retrenchment for traditional and corporatized SOEs would presuppose an identical
cost-benefit calculus for politicians irrespective of an enterprise’s ownership structure.
Following Shleifer’s and Vishny’s (1994) model on political interventions into enterprise
decisions, even partial privatization may increase the costs of political intervention at the
enterprise level, since non-state owners will ask for compensation for negative
performance effects. Partial privatization may therefore trigger a depoliticization of
decision-making at the enterprise level. Wong et al. (2004) have shown that different types
of shareholders are associated with varying degrees of political control in China’s listed
enterprises. We therefore investigate the determinants of labor restructuring for these two
types of SOEs separately. We expect that political-economic determinants of labor
retrenchment will be more evident for traditional SOEs than for corporatized SOEs, while
business-related determinants will be more evident for corporatized SOEs.

4. DATA AND METHODS
4.1 Data and Variables
Data Sources and Sample Enterprises

13

The empirical data for our research comes from a World Bank survey of China’s
enterprises. The survey was conducted by China’s National Bureau of Statistics in 2001. It
covers 323 SOEs, of which 197 are traditional and 126 are corporatized. The sample
enterprises are randomly drawn from ten sectors in five cities. A summary of enterprise
distributions across sectors and cities is shown in Table 2.

Insert Table 2 about here

As shown in Table 2, the five cities are Beijing, Chengdu, Guangzhou, Shanghai, and
Tianjin, covering municipalities in China’s highly developed eastern coastal belt (Beijing,
Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Tianjin) as well as the central region (Chengdu). The chosen
locations also represent different levels of market reforms, with Guangzhou representing
the most liberal province in terms of private sector development and Shanghai representing
a national base of SOEs concentrating in heavy industry.
The ten sectors include five service sectors—accounting, advertising and marketing,
business logistics, communication, and information technology—and five manufacturing
sectors—apparel and leather goods, consumer goods, electronic equipment, electronic
components, and vehicles and vehicle parts. The five chosen manufacturing industries
reflect China’s current or potential competitive sectors,4 while the five service sectors
represent fast-growing and relatively technologically advanced portions of China’s

4

For example, apparel and leather products, electronic equipment, respectively, accounted for 11.5% and
16.8% of China’s total exports in 1999.
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industry.
The data set provides us with a broad variety of enterprise-level data, which allows for
the measurement of the most important business-related determinants of labor policy
choices. We complement the data set with socioeconomic regional data to cover potential
political-economic determinants of employment restructuring. The socioeconomic data are
derived from China’s Labor Statistics Yearbook and the China Statistical Yearbook.

Dependent Variables
We construct the labor-retrenchment-rate variable as a direct measurement with which
to investigate how SOEs are tackling the surplus labor issue. The variable is defined as the
ratio of a labor reduction in the current period to the total work force of the preceding
period. Accordingly, the labor retrenchment rate is positive if an enterprise reduces the
number of workers it employs in the current period and negative if it increases the number.

Independent Variables
The determinants—business-related and political-economic factors—mentioned in the
previous theoretical discussion serve as explanatory variables.
Enterprise Performance. We employ two alternative variables—sales revenue and
profit—to measure enterprise performance. These variables are deflated by industrial price
indices created by the China Statistical Yearbook and are transformed into logistic form.
We first estimate a baseline model using the current value of the two performance
variables alternately as the determinant. We use current performance because labor
15

adjustments, in comparison with capital adjustments, are usually short-run responses that
can react more quickly and directly to current performance. We do not expect a serious
problem of endogeneity when current value of performance is used. Specifically, for the
first variable of sales revenue, a reduction in an enterprise’s excessive labor is unlikely to
affect its production capacity and sales volume. For the second variable of profit, a
reduction in labor redundancy is likely to improve the enterprise’s profit, so the effect of
labor reduction on profit is positive, which is the opposite of our hypothesized negative
effect of profit on labor reduction in the model. In sum, the endogeneity problem, if any,
will not cause an identification problem for our estimation. We take yet another step to use
lagged enterprise performance as an instrument for current performance, and we reestimate
the model as a robustness check.
Competition. We use two proxies for competition. The first is the number of
competitors for an enterprise’s major business line as estimated by enterprise managers.
The second is an enterprise’s ratio of exports to sales, which implies its exposure to
competition on the international market. The more an enterprise integrates into the world
market, the more severe the competition it faces, and the stronger incentives it has to
improve labor efficiency.
Government’s fiscal position. To approximate the government’s financial leverage, we
focus on the ratio of the balance of the government’s budget to gross domestic product
(GDP). It is assumed that governments under a budget deficit are more likely to refrain
from providing employment directly through SOEs than are governments with a balanced
budget or a surplus.
16

Absorption capacity for laid-off workers. We use two proxies to capture the local
absorption capacity for surplus labor. First, we calculate the ratio of reemployed laid-off
workers to laid-off workers who have not been reemployed. Second, we use employment
growth rates in the private sector, including foreign-involved enterprises. The private sector
was formally promoted as a convenient channel for absorbing redundant workers and
farmers in 1997 and is closely correlated with local growth and development. The two
proxies for reemployment chance are constructed at the city level.

Control Variables
Some factors can jointly affect labor retrenchment and our explanatory variables. We
introduce five control variables to capture possible confounding effects. The first control
variable is SOE age. Older SOEs with a long tradition in the planning apparatus are subject
to stronger political control and interference owing to their established and stable network
relationships with the government administration. At the same time, age is likely to be
negatively related to the extent of an SOE’s work force adjustment, because older SOEs
tend to have a higher level of organizational inertia. We therefore introduce the variable of
SOE age to eliminate the possible confounding age effect.
We also use an SOE’s total work force in the previous year to control for SOE size. A
large work force may be connected with a higher degree of underemployment and therefore
with higher potential for labor retrenchment than a smaller work force. On the other hand,
SOE size may be negatively related to the degree of labor retrenchment because there is a
cost advantage for the government in using larger SOEs to provide employment. Assume
17

that a local government decides that 5,000 positions for underemployed workers need to be
secured. Option 1 would be to bargain with 10 enterprises, each with 5,000 employees, to
convince each to keep 10% of its redundant workers. Option 2 would be to bargain with
100 enterprises, each with 500 employees, to convince each to keep 10% of its redundant
workers. Clearly, transactions costs would be much higher for option 2. This assumption is
consistent with the finding that privatization of large enterprises in Central Eastern
European countries is shaped by political-economic determinants, while progress in the
privatization of small enterprises is unaffected by such determinants (Opper 2004). We
therefore introduce the size of an SOE’s work force in the previous period to capture the
conflicting effects associated with SOE size.
The third control variable is unionization rates, defined as the proportion of workers
joining unions in different regions, to capture the bargaining position of workers vis à vis
the government and managers. According to Olson (1968) we may expect that
underemployed workers could articulate their interests more effectively and could threaten
to weaken a government’s public support base if they were better organized. Although
China’s labor unions have historically been subordinated to the interests of the Chinese
Communist Party and therefore lack an independent voice comparable to that of unions in
capitalist economies, unions are nevertheless the only bureaucracies in China that hold a
pro-worker stance. We therefore control for the unionization rate to remove the possible
confounding effect.
We also introduce a set of industrial dummies as control variables in our specification.
On the one hand, industrial sectors may be burdened with underemployment to varying
18

degrees because the government has fostered various national and local industrial policies
since 1989. On the other hand, industrial sectors may be correlated with our hypothesized
political-economic determinants. For example, different industries are likely to be
associated with different market competition conditions and varying enterprise
performance. Finally, year dummies are introduced to capture potential year-specific
business cycle effects.

4.2 Regression Models
We use the following model to estimate the determinants of labor retrenchment (see
Djankov and Murrell 2002).

Yit = α + β Xit + γ Pit + + δ CONTROLit + η Sector + θ Year + εit

(1)

where i and t represent enterprise i and period t respectively; εit is the error term. Y is a
measure of labor retrenchment ratio, X consists of variables representing business-related
factors, and P comprises political-economic factors. Control is a vector of control
variables. And Sector and Year are sector and year dummies to control the variation across
sectors and over years.
Two estimation issues are worth noting. First, we use white-corrected standard errors to
deal with potential heteroskedasticity. Second, we are unable to perform enterprise-specific
effects in our analysis since the socioeconomic environment variables vary across cities but
not across enterprises.
19

5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Sample Data
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of variables included in our regression model.
Three facts stand out in comparing statistics from traditional and corporatized SOEs. First,
for corporatized SOEs, the number of workers and amount of capital, on average, are 1,180
workers and 247 million RMB, while traditional SOEs have almost twice as many workers
and twice as much capital. Consistent with the official policy of “seizing the big and
relieving the small” (zhua da fang xiao), privatization in China was first confined to
relatively small SOEs. Second, corporatized SOEs are much younger than traditional
SOEs, with an average age of 20.97 and 28.39 years, respectively. Finally, it is shown that
the return on asset (ROA) of corporatized SOEs is three times that of traditional SOEs,
although the value of sales and profits in corporitized SOEs is less than that of traditional
SOEs.
The sampled SOEs cut around 4.3 percent of their work force on average between 1998
and 2000; the degree of labor reduction in traditional SOEs was slightly higher (4.7%) than
that of corporatized SOEs (3.8%). The difference in work force reduction between
traditional and corporatized SOEs is consistent with the fact that corporatized SOEs
usually succeed in reducing redundant labor when they undergo corporatization.
We notice that, on average, enterprise managers expect to have more than 313
competitors, which reflects the severe competition in the production market in the sample
sectors. Surprisingly, managers of traditional SOEs perceive stronger competition (381
20

competitors, on average) while corporatized SOEs perceive weaker competition (205
competitors, on average).
As indicated in Table 3, the export-to-sales ratio for SOEs is slightly higher than that
for corporatized SOEs (7.38 vs. 5.43), which is consistent with the long-standing policy of
granting foreign trade rights mainly to wholly state-owned enterprises in foreign trade. In
parallel, the larger size of traditional SOEs may place them in a stronger position to
compete on the global market.
The fiscal position to GDP ratio on average is negative, although the size of the budget
deficit is moderate (around 1.44%). The average annual reemployment rate and the
employment growth rate in the private sector are 45.21% and 42.72%, respectively, which
reflects a relatively favorable socioeconomic environment for labor reform over the survey
period. The unionization rate is generally high, with around 60% of the local work force
being organized in trade unions.

Insert Table 3 about here

We also conduct a Pearson correlation test and find that all correlations are lower than
the threshold value of 0.7, which suggests that our model is unlikely to suffer problems due
to multicollinearity.

Insert Table 4 about here
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5.2 Regression Results
Table 4 presents the results of our regression analyses of the determinants of labor
retrenchment among China’s SOEs.5 First, we notice that enterprise performance is
significantly and negatively correlated with the degree of labor retrenchment.6 This finding
is consistent with H1 and is consistent with two different interpretations of the nexus
between government and enterprises in labor decisions. The first interpretation is that the
government has transferred decision-making autonomy in labor decisions to managers and
has also sufficiently hardened SOEs’ financial constraints so that managers in enterprises
with declining performance are compelled to reduce their work force. The second
interpretation is that labor decisions in SOEs are still controlled by the government, but the
government’s decision to use SOEs to provide excessive employment depends on
enterprise performance. The government tends to use SOEs with improving performance to
keep excessive labor but to allow SOEs with declining performance to reduce labor. From
our estimates, we are not able to distinguish between these two interpretations.
Nevertheless, both explanations independently and jointly suggest that economic forces
meanwhile have had a significant effect on the recent wave of labor restructuring.
Regarding the relationship between competition and labor retrenchment, we find a
significantly positive relationship only between the number of competitors and the degree
of labor retrenchment for corporatized SOEs. For both traditional and corporatized SOEs,
there is no significant relationship between the integration into international markets and
the degree of labor retrenchment. Our study therefore provides only limited support for H2.
5

As we discuss above, we include sector and year dummies in the regressions to control for firm-specific and
year-specific effects. To save space, we do not report the estimated coefficients of these dummies.
6
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Market competition tends to generate more pressure for managers in corporatized SOEs,
while labor decisions in traditional SOEs are less significantly affected by competitive
pressure.
The fiscal position of local government is negatively related to the degree of labor
retrenchment in traditional SOEs but not in corporatized SOEs. H3 is therefore only
supported for traditional SOEs. Our results indicate that labor decisions in traditional SOEs
are shaped by budgetary conditions of local government either through direct transfer
effects (via subsidies to SOEs or expenditure on social welfare provision) or indirect
incentive effects of soft-budget constraints. The labor decisions in corporatized SOEs are
unrelated to government fiscal position, suggesting relatively independent labor decisions.
The reemployment ratio and the growth of employment in the private sector are
positively related to the degree of labor entrenchment in traditional SOEs; in particular, the
coefficient of the reemployment ratio for laid-off workers is significant. On the other hand,
the coefficients for corporatized SOEs are not only statistically insignificant but also
negative. As a result, our estimates support H4 for traditional SOEs but not for
corporatized SOEs. As we assume that local absorption capacity, rather than the objectives
of profit-oriented business entities, is the government’s major political concern, this result
once again suggests that labor decisions of traditional SOEs are related to government
objectives, while labor decisions of corporatized SOEs are unrelated. The relationship
between reemployment chances and labor retrenchment seems fairly robust. Using other
proxies such as changes in the official local unemployment rate and the percentage of
registered laid-off workers from SOEs in the reemployment market, our estimation results
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are confirmed, which underscores the critical role of the local employment situation in
SOEs’ labor retrenchment.
In addition, we notice that initial employment status is positively and significantly
associated with the labor retrenchment rate, which might suggest that the labor redundancy
problem is more serious in large enterprises, resulting in their need to cut more labor to
survive during the economic transition. Enterprise age has a positive effect on corporatized
SOEs but little effect on traditional SOEs. Finally, the labor union variable exhibits no
significant effect on labor entrenchment for either traditional or corporatized SOEs, which
suggests that unionization is not an effective avenue by which workers can resist labor
reduction.
The regression results of the model using lagged performance as the instrument
variable are shown in Table 5.

Insert Table 5 about here

Two items in Table 5 are worth noting. First, we find that not only the reemployment
ratio for laid-off workers but also employment growth in the private sector negatively and
significantly affect a enterprise’s labor retrenchment decisions, reinforcing Hypothesis 4,
which states that absorption capacity has a significant impact on labor decisions in
traditional SOEs. Second, the coefficient of competition for traditional SOEs is marginally
significant, which implies that competition pressure urges enterprises to reduce more
surplus labor, even in traditional SOEs. Other regression results in Table 4 remain
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unchanged except that the coefficient for one of the performance variables in corporatized
SOEs becomes statistically insignificant.

6. CONCLUSION
This study examines the determinants of the restructing of China’s SOEs in the late
1990s, which was eventually implemented to speed up employment restructuring after two
decades of only gradual and often hesitant reforms. Our particular interest was to examine
the business-related and political-economic determinants of labor retrenchment in China’s
traditional and corporatized SOEs, the objective being to shed light on the relationship
between SOEs and government in the increasingly marketized economy.
Our study yields four major findings. First, we find that the degree of labor
retrenchment is negatively related to enterprise performance, suggesting that poor
performance is a major force driving labor restructuring. Second, we find that market
competition is related to both traditional and corporatized SOEs, but its effect is more
evident for corporatized SOEs in our sample. This suggests that market competition
gradually becomes an effective disciplinary force for managers of China’s SOEs.
Furthermore, we offer evidence that decisions about labor retrenchment in traditional SOEs
are related to the local government’s fiscal position and to local reemployment conditions
for laid-off workers. In contrast, labor decisions in corporatized SOEs are not related to
these two variables.
In summary, this study suggests that China’s recent adjustment processes have been
driven at least partly by economic forces, as evidenced by the negative relationship
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between labor retrenchment and enterprise performance in both traditional and
corporatized SOEs. In this sense our study suggests that to some extent restructuring is
possible without ownership reforms. Nonetheless, the significant relationship between
political-economic determinants (as measured by local reemployment chances and fiscal
constraints) and labor retrenchment suggests that local governments still employ traditional
SOEs if this is deemed necessary to support social stability. Corporatized SOEs with nonstate shareholders, on the other hand, seem to enjoy greater autonomy in labor decisions, as
a direct relationship between the enterprise’s labor policies and the political-economic
conditions could not be substantiated. Our results on corporatized SOEs support the idea
that depoliticization of enterprise decision-making—one of the major enterprise reform
objectives in formerly centrally planned socialist economies—can actually be achieved
without full-scale privatization. This finding is consistent with Wong et al (2004), who
found significant depoliticization effects for China’s partially privatized listed enterprises.
This study supports the possibility of de-politicization for labor decisions in China’s
corporatized SOEs not undergoing stock listings.
The differences between pure and corporatized SOEs in terms of labor retrenchment,
however, underscore the fact that some degree of non-state ownership is beneficial for the
depoliticization of enterprise decision-making. The results are consistent with the
arguments of Shleifer and Vishny (1994), which suggest that the existence of private
owners and their individual interests in profit maximization reduces the bargaining power
of politicians and thereby increases the costs of political interference in enterprise decisionmaking.
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Skeptics might claim that the greater freedom of corporatized SOEs could simply
reflect a selection bias in the sense that the government only corporatized those SOEs that
were not needed as policy tools. In fact, the selection effect is consistent with the
observation that China’s central government delayed SOEs’ ownership reforms to preserve
SOEs as tools of employment provision. Based on our results, we are unable to determine
whether the government voluntarily refrains from using corporatized SOEs as policy tools
or whether it is simply unable to exert effective control owing to resistance from private
investors. In light of our recent empirical findings on the persistence of political control of
decision-making in China’s partially privatized listed enterprises (Opper et al. 2002, Wong
et al 2004), and given the fact that the state retains a controlling share in corporatized
SOEs, we have doubts that government will completely restrain from involving in any
decision-making and that our results could be fully attributed to a selection bias. Instead,
we expect that they reflect the complementary effect of both mechanisms.
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Table 1. Main Indicators of State-Owned Enterprises in China, 1990–2002
Main Indicators of State-Owned and State-Holding Industrial Enterprises
Number of
Enterprises

Gross
Value Added
Total Profits
No. of workers
Labor
Industrial
of Industry
productivity
Output Value
(unit = 1)
(unit = 100
(unit =100
(unit =100
(yuan-personmillion RMB)
million RMB)
million RMB) (unit = 10.000)
year)
1990
74775
12570
388
10346
12150
1991
75248
13934
4019
402
10664
13066
1992
74066
16711
5193
535
10889
15346
1993
80586
22088
7281
817
10920
20227
1994
79731
25301
7903
829
11214
22562
1995
87905
25890
8307
666
11261
22991
1996
86982
27289
8742
413
11244
24270
1997
74388
27859
9193
428
11044
25225
1998
64737
33621
11077
525
9058
37118
1999
61301
35571
12132
998
8572
41497
2000
53489
40554
13778
2408
8102
50055
2001
46767
42408
14652
2389
7640
55508
2002
41125
45179
15935
2633
7163
63073
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (Various Issues)
1. The gross industrial output value in 1995 was calculated in accordance with new stipulations.
2. The overall labor productivity between 1994 and 1995 is incomparable because of a new definition
of gross industrial output value.
3. Data before 1994 include SOEs only.
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Table 2. Sample Distribution (323 State-Owned Enterprises)
Sectors/Cities
Accounting Services
Advertising & Marketing
Apparel & Leather Goods
Business Logistics Services
Communication Services
Consumer Products
Electronic Components
Electronic Equipment
Information Technology Services
Vehicles & Vehicle Parts
Total

Obs.
15
20
50
52
20
18
37
39
22
50
323

Beijing
2
1
11
9
5
1
18
10
3
8
68
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Chenngdu
5
4
12
13
1
8
10
8
2
15
78

Guangzhou
2
2
6
12
6
1
1
3
6
7
46

Shanghai
3
10
12
10
4
5
2
8
4
11
69

Tianjin
3
3
9
8
4
3
6
10
7
9
62

Table 3. Summary Statistics
Variable Name
Labor Retrenchment
Labor Retrenchment Rate
Enterprise Production and Performance
Employees

All SOEs
Mean
Std. Dev.

Traditional SOEs
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.

Corporatized SOEs
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.

Unit

Obs.

Percent

896

4.37

20.84

562

4.71

19.67

364

3.80

22.69

Workers

944

4999.6

583

962
966

1793799
20.47

588
590

6190.52
2128997
0
20.72

Sales Revenue

1000 RMB

947

487393.7

583

594325.1

364

Profit
Return on Asset (ROA)
Competition
Number of Competitor
Export to Sales Ratio
Socioeconomic Environment (by city)
Government Fiscal Position
Reemployed Ratio for Laid-Off Workers
Employment Growth in Private Sectors
Unionization Rate

1000 RMB
Ratio

927
938

177921.5
10.96

583
580

215738.3
8.55

353
358

805.49
126114.
4
20.97
64563.9
9
14981.4
5
2.62

1814.89

1000 RMB
Year

1412.01
324172.
5
28.39
125726.
2
23083.8
2
0.89

361

Capital
Age of Enterprise

1180.07
247172.
8
25.5
102217.
2
19974.7
8
1.55

Enterprises
Ratio

879
947
Beijing
-3.19
55.05
27.83
54.97

313.68
6.63
Chengdu
2.76
43.63
24.07
54.27

1247.43
19.64
Guangzhou
-2.00
42.38
18.88
41.70

542
583
Shanghai
-2.66
56.11
17.20
73.37

381.08
7.38
Tianjin
-3.02
26.29
14.06
71.67

1434.42
21.36

337
364

205.28
5.43

856.82
16.48

Ratio
Ratio
Ratio
Ratio
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374
376

847683
19.23
224597.
1
88140.1
3
13.94
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Table 4. OLS Estimation on Labor Retrenchment, 1998–2000
Dependent Variable:
Labor Retrenchment Rate
Business-Related Factors
Ln (Sales)

Traditional SOEs
-2.2136***
(0.664)

-3.4366***
(1.074)

Ln (Profit)
Ln (Number of Competitors)
Export to Sales Ratio
Political-Economic Factors
Fiscal Position to GDP ratio
Reemployment Ratio for LaidOff Workers
Employment Growth in Private
Sector
Control Variables
One-Period Lagged Ln(Labor)
Ln (Age)
Unionization

Corporatized SOEs

0.8935
(0.552)
-0.0001
(0.044)

-1.3513***
(0.460)
0.2408
(0.409)
0.0231
(0.058)

1.4187*
(0.748)
0.0178
(0.090)

-1.9883**
(0.884)
0.3739
(0.877)
0.0268
(0.084)

-0.6200**
(0.286)
0.1877*
(0.098)
0.0020
(0.074)

-0.9874***
(0.305)
0.0661
(0.064)
0.0817
(0.066)

-0.7991
(0.548)
-0.1398
(0.095)
-0.0569
(0.123)

-0.4871
(0.634)
-0.1666
(0.104)
0.0263
(0.138)

3.1958***
(0.915)
1.2858
(1.201)
-0.1021
(0.092)

2.6902***
(0.762)
1.3508
(1.456)
0.0035
(0.093)

4.8627***
(1.264)
5.2032**
(2.082)
0.0853
(0.121)

3.2189***
(1.144)
8.0920***
(2.735)
0.1002
(0.145)

Sectoral Dummies

Yes

Yes

Year Dummies

Yes

Yes

Constant
Observations
Adjusted R-Squared

-2.4460
(9.538)
479
0.163

-11.2906
(11.256)
358
0.155

-4.2212
(12.543)
284
0.232

Note: 1) ***, **, and * represent significant level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
2) The numbers in brackets are white-correct standard error in the presence of heteroskdasticity.
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-18.2319
(14.318)
232
0.236

Table 5. Robustness Check Using Lagged Performance as the Instrument
Dependent Variable:
Labor Retrenchment Rate
Business-Related Factors
Ln (Sales)

Traditional SOEs
-2.499***
(0.657)

-2.895**
(1.176)

Ln (Profit)
Ln (Number of Competitors)
Export to Sales Ratio
Political-Economic Factors
Fiscal Position to GDP Ratio
Reemployment Ratio for Laid-Off
Workers
Employment Growth in Private
Sectors
Control Variables
One-period Lagged Ln (Labor)
Ln (Age)
Unionization

Corporatized SOEs

0.8455**
(0.4177)
-0.0002
(0.042)

-0.9782*
(0.554)
0.4810
(0.424)
-0.0511
(0.055)

1.3418**
(0.667)
0.0121
(0.076)

-1.0596
(1.234)
0.8466
(0.782)
0.0762
(0.071)

-0.635*
(0.324)
0.1835**
(0.074)
-0.0065
(0.066)

-0.988***
(0.321)
-0.0097
(0.071)
0.1268*
(0.069)

-0.7872
(0.562)
-0.1154
(0.106)
-0.0068
(0.124)

-0.4936
(0.595)
-0.1436
(0.112)
0.1947
(0.137)

3.3519***
(0.889)
1.3885
(1.108)
-0.1010
(0.075)

2.4952***
(0.828)
0.4707
(1.190)
-0.0450
(0.083)

4.5059***
(1.353)
4.9595***
(1.436)
0.1208
(0.147)

2.4650
(1.609)
4.4580**
(1.776)
-0.0357
(0.168)

Sectoral Dummies

Yes

Yes

Year Dummies

Yes

Yes

Constant
Observations
Adjusted R-squared
First Stage Regression
Lagged Ln (Enterprise Performance)
Adjusted R-Squared

-0.6380
(8.840)
476
0.17

-4.2568
(8.894)
295
0.19

-13.1079
(13.564)
278
0.23

-11.6876
(15.357)
190
0.27

0.90

0.76

0.86

0.72

Note: 1) ***, **, and * represent significant level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
2) The numbers in brackets are white-correct standard error in the presence of heteroskdasticity.
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